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    1. Introduction    
 
It is an honor and a pleasure to contribute to this festschrift for George Ellis. I first 
became interested in the topic of downward causation as a result of conversations that I had 
many years ago with Roger Sperry when I was a postdoc at Caltech. I’ve always thought that 
there was something right in the basic idea but it has only been recently, partly as a consequence 
of reading work by Ellis (and others such as Denis Noble) as well as some philosophical 
criticisms of downward causation that struck me as misguided that I have thought that I might 
have something to say on this subject. The ideas that follow reflect the influence of Ellis and 
Noble as well as some recent developments in machine learning and computer science 
concerning forming macro-variables from more fine-grained realizing micro-variables (e.g. 
Chalupka et al., 2017)2.     
I begin, though, with some stage setting and methodological remarks. I’m a philosopher 
of science with an interest in methodology and in causal reasoning. I approach the issues around 
downward causation from that perspective, not that of metaphysician. Although I address some 
metaphysical arguments against the possibility of downward causation, my primary concerns are 
methodological: my goal is to try to understand what it is about certain systems that inclines a 
number of scientists to characterize their behavior in terms of downward causation, whether such 
characterizations are ever correct, and if so, in what circumstances. I thus proceed on the 
assumption that the metaphysical issues are not the only ones that deserve philosophical 
attention3.   
 I also approach this subject from what I have elsewhere described as a functional 
perspective (Woodward, 2014, forthcoming): we should think about causal claims in terms of the 
goals and functions that we want to such claims to serve—in terms of what we want to do with 
such claims. The interventionist account of causation I describe below embodies this 
functionalist picture: the idea is that one important function of causal claims is to describe the 
results of manipulations or interventions. This leads to the way in which I frame the issues 
around downwards causation: these have to do roughly with whether interventions on upper- 
 
1 Thanks to Jan Voosholz for helpful comments on an earlier draft.  
2 For additional relevant work in machine learning and computer science on forming macro-
variables from underlying micro-variables see Beckers and Halpern, 2019, Rubenstein et al. 
2017.  
3 Contrary to the anonymous referee for this chapter, who claims that the metaphysical issues are 
the only ones that “count”. For the role that this rhetorical strategy of dismissal of the non-
metaphysical plays in contemporary philosophical discussion, see Woodward (2017) 
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level variables can systematically change lower-level variables and if so, under what conditions 
this is possible.  
  As I note in Section 3, there are many cases, both drawn from various sciences and from 
common-sense causal thinking that seem to be naturally described in terms of downward 
causation, understood as described above. I do not claim that such descriptions are correct 
merely because they seem natural or prima-facie plausible or fit with what various scientists have 
said about the examples. As I said above, I’m very aware that there are in-principle metaphysical 
objections (based on causal exclusion arguments, worries about violations of the causal closure 
of the physical and so on) to the very possibility of downward causation. At the same time, as a 
philosopher of science, I think that it is very much in order to explore what it is about these 
examples that has led many to think of them in terms of downward causation. (In other words, I 
assume that if there are any plausible cases of downward causation, these are the sorts of 
examples we should be looking at.)  This functional orientation leads me to explore such 
questions as what the use might be of a notion of downward causation, why we might find it 
fruitful to operate with such a notion, what kind of evidence might persuade us that downward 
causation is present and so on. Of course if the notion is incoherent for metaphysical reasons, 
then the fact that we might like to think in terms of downward causation cannot show that that 
the notion is legitimate. But if the metaphysical objections can be disarmed and if we can 
provide a coherent account of what downward causation involves, why such a notion is a useful 
one and what sorts of situations are appropriately described in terms of this notion, this can 
provide a vindication of the notion. In any event this will be my strategy.  
        Metaphysicians sometimes accuse philosophers of science like me of conflating 
epistemology/methodology with metaphysics or illegitimately arguing from the former from the 
latter. They acknowledge that we have methods that may be interpreted as providing evidence 
for downward causation and that it may be “pragmatically useful” to think in terms of this 
notion, but insist that this shows nothing about whether downward causation is “real”, 
ontologically or metaphysically speaking. This line of argument raises issues that I cannot fully 
address in this paper. I will say, however, that on the functional approach to causation (and to 
methodology more generally) that I favor, we should not expect methodology/epistemology and 
metaphysics/ontology (insofar as the latter has to do with what is “really out there”) to come 
apart in this way. On a functional notion of causation—one that we can use— the causal 
relations that are out there,  must be such that, at least in some range of cases, we can know 
whether they are present are not. Our account of the methodology/epistemology of causal 
reasoning should to this extent fit with the worldly structures associated with such relationships.  
Consider, in this light,  someone who  holds that what causation “really is”4, 
metaphysically speaking, has nothing to do with what is disclosed by controlled experiments (the 
experiments being “merely of epistemological significance”) so that even if there if are 
experiments in which upper-level variables are manipulated with associated changes in lower 
variables  this tells us nothing about whether downward causation  is “real”. I can envision two 
possible defenses for such a claim. The first is simply that the experiments in question don’t 
really show the presence of downward causation, because when so interpreted they are defective 
in some way—e.g., they fail to control for confounders which should be controlled for (which is 
one way of interpreting causal exclusion arguments). I claim that the defender of downward 
causation has a good response to this sort of objection.  (Section 7). The other possible response 
 
4 For more on this theme, see Woodward, forthcoming.  
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is that even if the experiments I interpret  as showing downward causation are unimpeachable 
from the point of view of experimental design, showing that “downward causation is “real” 
present requires some more – that is, there is some thicker notion of causation (“real causation”) 
that fails to be present in apparent downward causation cases, even in the presence of 
experimental results like those described above  . Here I would challenge those inclined to this 
view to explain what this “something more” involves, how to detect when it is present, why it is 
a useful or appropriate to have a conception of causation that incorporates it,  and how this 
conception excludes downward causation. One would also like an explanation of why 
experimentation fails to detect causal relations in cases involving relations  between upper and 
lower level variables but (presumably) succeeds in other cases.  It is not obvious how such an 
account might proceed. 
 
2.  Causation and Intervention in the Presence of Realizing Relations.  
 
         To develop an account of downward causation (or, more generally, causal claims in which 
the candidate causes are upper-level variables and the effects either lower or upper level) we first 
need to specify what we mean by “causation”.  I adopt the following version of an  
interventionist or manipulationist account defended in Woodward, 2003:  
 
 (M) Where X and Y are variables, X causes Y iff there are some possible interventions 
that would change the value of X and if were such intervention to occur, a regular change 
in the value of Y would occur5.   
 
Woodward, 2003 provides a a technically precise characterization of “intervention” and similar 
notions are characterized in Pearl, 2000 and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000. However it is 
important to understand that these characterizations were intended to apply to cases in which 
only causal relations among variables and not supervenience relations are present. Further 
clarification is required when we apply the notion of an intervention to cases in which 
supervenience relations are present—see below. As long as we are restricted to cases in which no 
supervenience relations are present, we may think of an  intervention I on X with respect to Y as 
causing a change in the value of X that is of such a character that any change in Y, should it 
 
5 A couple of additional remarks: First, in order to avoid needless verbiage, I will usually 
describe causal relata as “variables” but of course readers should understand this as shorthand for 
“whatever in the world corresponds to variables or to variables taking certain values”. Thus 
causal relata are features like mass and charge that may be possessed by systems in the world. 
Also, in order to simplify the discussion, I will confine myself to cases in which the causal 
relationships in which we are interested are deterministic. In my view, nothing fundamental 
changes when we consider indeterministic causal relations, except that “regular change” needs to 
be interpreted as something like “regular change in the probability distribution of Y”. Finally, the 
“regular change” requirement in M, which  is imposed in Woodward, 2003, pp. 41-2, means 
simply that there must be some values of X such interventions that set those values are followed 
by regular or uniform responses in Y. This is fully compatible with there being other values of X 
for which this is not true. In other words the condition  in M that there must be “some” (not 
necessarily all)  values of X  associated under interventions with changes in Y   should be 
understood as requiring that for those values there should be a uniform response in Y.  
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occur, occurs only “through” X.  Expressed slightly differently, an intervention I on X with 
respect to Y is an unconfounded change in X—unconfounded in the sense that I does not affect Y 
via any causal route6 that does not go through X.   Manipulations of putative effect variables in 
well-designed experiments, including those achieved in randomized controlled trials, are 
paradigm cases of interventions. The intention behind M is to capture the common sense idea 
that the mark of a causal relationship is that causes are potential “handles” for changing effects; 
causal relationships are those relationships that can be exploited “in principle” for manipulation 
and control, in the sense that if manipulating X would be in principle a way of manipulating Y, 
then X causes Y, and conversely.  
 My conception of downward causation simply applies this interventionist picture   to the 
case in which X is at a “higher level”7 than Y. In such a case when (and only when) Y changes in 
a regular manner under interventions on X,  X  is a downward cause of Y.  It is worth 
emphasizing that this is a “thin” notion of causation, both metaphysically and otherwise. For X to 
cause Y it is not required that there be a continuous process running from X to Y, that X 
“transmit” energy or “biff” or “umph” to Y (or anything similar). Nor is it required that X and Y 
are variables that occur in some “fundamental” theory drawn from physics. Readers should thus  
keep in mind that when I talk about downward causation all that I mean by causation is a 
relationship that satisfies M (suitably elaborated to apply to cases in which supervenience 
relations are present in the manner applied below)—nothing fancier or richer8.  
The conception just described is very close (perhaps identical) to the understanding of 
downward causation advocated in Ellis (2016) 
 
One demonstrates the existence of top-down causation whenever manipulating a higher-
level variable can be shown to reliably change lower-level variables 
 
 
6 “Causal route” here is intended to contrast with routes or paths corresponding to supervenience 
relations. Again, we need a somewhat different account of how interventions behave when 
supervenience relations are present.   
7 The notion of “level” is used in many different and not entirely consistent ways in both science 
and philosophy.  In my view it is doubtful that there is any single characterization of this notion 
that will fit all these uses. Rather than getting bogged down in trying to provide such a 
characterization I will rely instead on generally accepted judgments in the scientific literature 
about particular cases as well as some defeasible criteria. For example, I will assume that 
variables are often legitimately regarded as at different levels when one is a coarse-graining of 
the other and that variables used to characterize wholes are often legitimately regarded as at a 
different level than variables that characterize their parts). For additional discussion, see 
Woodward, 2020. 
8 I stress this point because, as noted earlier, I think that some of the opposition to the idea  that 
there can be downward causation or causation involving upper-level variables depends on the 
(often tacit)  assumption of a richer or thicker notion of causation and the thought that this sort of 
causation is not present in relations involving upper-level variables. We should separate the 
question of whether there are downward causal relations that are causal in the sense of M from 
whether there can be downward causal relations according to some alternative conception of 
causation. I’m concerned only with the former issue in this essay.    
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Although this is the basic idea, as I have said, some additional explication is required to specify 
how it is to be understood in contexts in which variables at different levels are present. To fix our 
ideas, let us assume that we have two sets of variables Ui (for upper) and Lj (for lower). Assume 
that a full specification of the values of the lower-level variables determines the values of the 
upper-level variables, so that the latter “supervene” on the former. We also assume that different 
values of the Ljs can “realize” the same value of a U variable, so that “multiple realization” is 
present.  For reasons described in footnote 8 in most cases of this sort the relationship between 
the Us and the Ls will not be one of identity, either of types or tokens, but will instead amount (in 
the case in which the Ls are low- level physical variables) to a version of non-reductive 
physicalism9.  In what follows I will assume that such “realization” takes a very specific form: 
for each upper level variable Ui there is a many to one surjective10 function that maps a number 
of different values of the Ljs into each value of Ui. We can think of this function as taking one of 
two possible forms. One possibility is that  a number of different values of  the same Li variable 
are mapped into (realize) a single value of a Ui variable. As a standard example, 
 think of the values of Lj as very high dimensional specifications (profiles) of the  possible 
combinations of kinetic energy that might be assumed by the molecules making up a gas. That is, 
a single value of Lj specifies a possible   kinetic energy for molecule 1, a possible  kinetic energy 
for molecule 2 and so on. A different value of Lj specifies a different n-tuple of kinetic energies 
for the individual molecules. A given value  of the upper level variable Ui (e.g., Ui might be 
temperature T) then can be realized by a very large number of  different values  of Li.   Another 
possibility is that values of several different lower-level variables are mapped into the same value 
of an upper-level variable. For example, the upper-level variable total cholesterol (TC) is the sum 
of the values of two lower-level variables, low density cholesterol (LDL) and high density 
cholesterol (HDL). Different combinations of values of HDL and LDL can realize the same value 
of TC.  For the purposes that follow, there are no deep differences between these two 
possibilities and because it will simplify the exposition I will often just talk about the 
relationship between an upper level variable U and a single realizing variable L, assuming that it 
is obvious how to generalize this to cases in which the realizers of U are functions from values of 
several different L variables11.   
 
9 A common assumption (which I endorse) is that when the relation between upper and lower-
level variables is one of identity there is no particular puzzle about how downward causation and  
causal relations among upper-level variables are possible: the upper-level variables stand in 
exactly the same causal relations as the lower-level variables with which they are identical. The 
issues around downward causation become less trivial when non-identity and multiple realization 
is assumed 
10 We assume that this function is surjective to capture the standard assumption that every value 
of each of the Uis is realized by some value (typically many values) of the Ljs. For example, any 
possible value of temperature of a dilute gas is realized by some (typically many) profile(s) of 
molecular kinetic energies.  
11 I acknowledge that the possibility just described it a very simple one --  I assume it because it 
is simple, because it is one way of making “realization” precise, and because it is in many ways 
one of least friendly assumptions for the possibility of downward causation. (That is, if 
downward causation makes sense in such contexts, it is plausible that it will also make sense in 
contexts in which realization relations that cannot be represented in the simple way I have 
described.)  In this connection I want to explicitly note that there are many other sorts of cases in 
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     In any case, the realization relation is understood as an “unbreakable” constraint relation 
rather than a causal relationship. It is unbreakable in the sense that the relationship cannot be 
disrupted by any combination of interventions. For example, although one can manipulate the 
temperature of a dilute gas (and in doing so will also manipulate the average kinetic energy of its 
component molecules), one cannot through interventions alter the relationship between 
temperature and average kinetic energy – this is treated as fixed.  To anticipate discussion below, 
when L and U stand in  a realization relation the nature of this relationship is such that they are 
not sufficiently “distinct” to stand in a causal relationship.  Thus an upper-level variable U does 
not cause its realizers L12 and similarly L does not cause U. However, U may cause some other 
variable lower-level  L* that it distinct from its realizer L. When this is the case, there is 
downward causation from U to L.  
      Consider an intervention on an upper-level variable U in   a context of the sort just 
described—e.g., the temperature T of a gas in a container is manipulated by placing it in a heat 
bath. Different interventions each of which sets T to some value t will be realized by different 
combinations of values of the lower-level molecular variables Kj on different occasions (for that 
 
science in which inter-level relations are described (at least by philosophers) by means of words 
like “realization”, “constitution” and so on  which involve more complex relationships between 
upper and lower-level variables.  For an instructive  illustration of some of these complexities in 
the case of neuronal modeling at different levels, see Herz et al., 2006.   In such more complex 
cases, the variables of the upper level theory may not “line up” in any simple or well-behaved 
way with the variables of the lower level theory, the mathematics employed at different levels 
may be quite different (ordinary versus partial differential equations versus black box Bayesian 
models etc.), and as a result  the relations between different levels may be mathematically very 
complex. Moreover,  in many cases, a fully adequate characterization of an upper-level variable 
will involve reference to what looks like upper-level information as well as information about its 
lower-level realizers. For example, in the illustration above, I neglected the fact that the notion of 
temperature of a gas, as usually understood, is only well-defined if the gas is at equilibrium, 
which is an “upper-level” feature of the whole gas.   
One consequence of this complexity is that a good deal of work is often required to 
connect information at one level to information at  different levels—there may not be anything 
like the simple functional relations I assume above.  I will ignore/abstract away from this in what 
follows. Finally, let me add that the complexity of the relation between upper and lower level 
variables is one of several reasons why it is often wrong to take this relationship to be one of 
identity (and, as claimed above, why some form of non-reductive physicalism seems like a more 
plausible account of this relationship) . An additional consideration is that the most plausible 
understanding of the notion of identity within the interventionist framework requires a notion of 
identity between variables and between values of variables. In both cases, a plausible necessary 
condition is that identical variables (or values) should have the same dimensionality—this of 
course is violated when there is coarse-graining or dimension reduction of the sort described 
above. 
 
12 As noted below, some prominent discussions (e.g., Craver and Bechtel, 2007) proceed on the 
assumption that if there is such a thing as downward causation it involves an upper-level variable 
causing its realizer. I  agree that upper-level variables  do not cause their  realizers but argue 
(Section 4) that this is not what downward causation involves.  
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matter, the molecular realization of T will vary from moment to moment for the same gas)13. The 
experimenter thus controls the value of T via the heat bath (that is why it is appropriate to think 
of the intervention as an intervention on T) in the sense that the experimenter possesses a 
procedure that can reliably and repeatedly impose that temperature. However, the experimenter 
does not control in this sense   which particular values of  the molecular kinetic energies that  
realize that value of T – putting the gas in a heat bath is not a procedure that reliably imposes any 
particular molecular realization of T=t.  Instead this  realization varies from occasion to occasion 
or over time in a way that is unknown to the  experimenter and effectively random from the  
point of view of what the experimenter can influence14.   
As Ellis suggests, we may think of the values of the variables  Kj   that realize the same value 
of T as in the same equivalence class, yielding a partition of the different values of Kj based on 
this equivalence relation. Of course  because of the nature of the realization relationship between 
T and  the Kjs  any intervention  that changes the value of T, from, say   T=t1 to T= t2 must  at 
the same time change the values of  the lower-level realizing variables Kj from  values that 
realize  T= t1 to   different values   that realize  T=t2—that is, to a different equivalence class. 
Contrary to the arguments of a number of philosophers (e.g.,  Baumgartner,  2010), we thus do 
not build into the notion of an intervention the requirement that an intervention on U change the 
 
13 Thus if one wants to represent such an intervention within a directed graph framework, the 
appropriate way to do this, as suggested in Woodward, 2015, is by means of a single intervention 
I  that sets   T=t and at the same time “selects” some value from the equivalence class of lower 
level realizers of T=t.  There are not two different interventions, one that sets T=t and distinct 
from this a separate, independent intervention the intervention that sets the value of the lower 
level realizer of T=t.   It is a also mistake to represent such an intervention as a common cause of 
both T and the realizing variable or variables Kj, as, for example, Baumgartner 2018 does —that 
is to represent the intervention as Kj  I  T.  It follows from standard assumptions made about 
causal representation in directed graphs (including, for example, the condition of independent 
fixability (IF) described below), that such a common cause representation would only be 
appropriate if it were possible to intervene to carry out independent interventions  on T and  the 
Kj, changing each independently of the other.  The realization relationship between T and Kj 
rules out this possibility. This is not a pedantic point because the common cause representation is 
used by Baumgartner and others to motivate the claim that one needs to control for Kj in 
assessing the causal effect of T and hence immediately to a causal exclusion argument according 
to which T is causally inert—again see below.  
14 In some cases, including the case of temperature discussed above, it may be reasonable to 
assume that for each value of the upper level variable, there is a single stable probability 
distribution over the values of the lower-level realizers of the upper-level variable that applies 
whenever there is an intervention on the upper-level variable. However, in many other cases, this 
will not be a plausible assumption and I do not adopt it in what follows. The requirement 
described below that the realizers of each value of the upper-level variable have a uniform effect 
on the effect variable of interest amounts to the assumption that such uniformity holds for all 
probability distributions over the values of the realizing variables. However, there are various 
ways of relaxing this requirement, one of which is simply to require that uniformity hold only for 
all “reasonable” probability distributions, where “reasonable” might mean, e.g., “absolutely 
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.” Other possibilities for relaxing the uniformity 
requirement are described below.  
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value of U while leaving values of  the lower variables Lj that realize that value of U unchanged.  
Such interventions are impossible (because the realization relation is an unbreakable constraint); 
adopting such a requirement would have the consequence that interventions on upper-level 
variables are never possible and would render this notion useless for purposes of understanding 
upper-level causation.15  (Recall that M requires that for a variable X to have a causal effect, 
interventions on X must be possible.)  
In order to apply M to contexts in which different levels are present, we must also impose the 
following requirement (called realization independence in Woodward, 2008): when values of U 
are realized by a number of different values of Ls, an intervention on U with respect to some 
second variable Y that sets U=u  must have a uniform (or approximately uniform) effect on Y for 
all lower level realizations of the value U=u. In other words, an intervention that sets U=u, must 
result  in the same response for Y (Y=y), regardless of how U=u is realized at the lower level16.  
 Here again Ellis imposes a closely related requirement: “the same top level state must lead to 
the same top level outcome, independent of which lower level state instantiates the higher level 
state”.  (2016, 121) 
The effect of this requirement of realization independence  is to exclude so -called 
“ambiguous manipulations” (Spirtes and Scheines, 2004) in which the result of setting U=u on 
some second variable  Y depends on how U=u is realized.  To illustrate, suppose that the lower 
level variables are HDL and LDL (as discussed above) with HDL having a favorable effect on 
heart health and LDL an unfavorable effect. The upper-level variable TC (total cholesterol) 
which is the arithmetic sum of HDL and LDL will   fail the realization independence requirement 
with respect to heart health since the impact of TC =tc on heart  health will depend upon the 
particular combination of values of HDL and LDL that realize TC= tc.  One way of motivating 
this requirement is to note that it is needed for the effect on Y of an intervention on U to be well-
 
15 More technically, in contexts in which a realization relation between U and L (or some set of 
Ls) is present, the requirement in Woodward, 2003 that an intervention  I on U with respect to a 
second variable Y not affect Y via  variables on paths  that  do not go through U  (“off path 
variables”) should be understood in such a way that the variable  L  which realizes U   is not 
treated as such an “off-path” variable.  This corresponds to the idea that Ls should not be treated 
as potential confounders for the U  Y relationship which we have to “control for” to see the 
effect of U on Y. Some additional justification for this (which seems to me a common sense 
requirement) is provided in Woodward, 2015 and also below (Section 7).  
16 As several writers note (e.g. Butterfield, 2012, Rubenstein et al, 2017, we can think of this 
uniformity requirement as amounting to a kind of coherence or consistency requirement between 
the causal relations involving upper and lower-level variables. Given some natural additional 
assumptions (described in Rubenstein, et al, 2017), it is equivalent to the following 
“commutivity” requirement:  Suppose F describes the lower-level functional relationship 
between L1 and L2, g1 describes the realizing relation that maps L1 to U1, g2 the realizing 
relation between L2 and U2 and H describes the upper-level causal relation between U1 and U2. 
Then for U1 to cause U2  and for consistency across levels,  the result of beginning with some 
value of L1, applying F to it to yield L2 and then coarse graining L2 via g2 to yield some value 
for U2 = u2 should be the same as  beginning with the same  value of L1, coarsening it via g1 to 




defined: this requires, as Ellis, says, that there be a “regular” or “same” response of Y to the 
intervention on U.  This implies that to the extent that we are interested in effects on heart health, 
TC is not a “good” upper-level variable—not a good candidate for an upper-level cause. It should 
be replaced by variables that have unambiguous (or at least less ambiguous) effects on heart 
health. 
Note that the requirement of realization independence, like the notion of an intervention itself 
is always defined relative to a candidate effect variable. It common for an intervention on U that 
satisfies the realization independence with respect to Y to fail to satisfy this requirement with 
respect to some distinct variable Y*.  
  The conditions described are, I believe, necessary for downward causation but I do not 
claim they are jointly sufficient17. However, I believe it is plausible that whatever additional 
conditions may be required for sufficiency are satisfied for the examples of downward causation  
I will discuss below—or so I will assume.     
 
17 Why might one think that the conditions described above are not sufficient? My doubts arise 
from the following consideration. It looks as though an upper level variables U1   might meet 
those conditions and yet be (at least from our perspective) highly gerry-mandered, non- 
compactly distributed and difficult to recognize, measure or manipulate.  Consider tosses of a 
fair coin. We might form the equivalence class of all those initial conditions of the coin and the 
tossing apparatus that lead to heads – take all these to have the value h--   and the equivalence 
class of those conditions leading to tails (these have the value t). We might then form the upper 
level variable C which takes the values h and t.  By construction the values of C have a uniform 
effect on the final position of the coin. But whether or not C is an “in principle” legitimate upper 
-level variable or candidate cause, it is certainly not a useful variable, assuming that we have no 
way of telling, apart from the final position of the coin, which value of C is realized in any 
particular toss, no way of manipulating C and so on.   
A natural thought which is suggested in passing by Ellis, is that at least in many cases in 
which we find it natural to talk of upper level or top-down causation,  we expect some additional 
condition to be satisfied that excludes cases of the sort just described: we want the candidate 
upper-level variable   to correspond to  something we can measure with  relatively macroscopic 
(upper-level) measurement procedures and manipulate by means of macroscopic interventions, 
where  we require such interventions to  have  coordinated   or orderly effects on lower-level 
variables. This expectation is fairly well satisfied in connection with thermodynamic variables—
we have straightforward procedures for measuring and manipulating these  – e.g.,  by putting the 
gas in a heat bath or  by compressing it with a piston. When we do this we think of ourselves as 
imposing a co-ordinated change in the behavior of the constituents of the gas.  This goes along 
with the more general thought that talk of upper-level causation seems most appropriate when 
there is a kind of order or co-ordination or coherence in the behavior of the lower-level 
constituents that realize the upper-level variables, with the loss of such order corresponding to 
cases in which causation resides more exclusively at lower levels, as the example involving 
energy cascades in Section 3 illustrates. There are connections here with the distinction between 





Finally, there are two other conditions on causation in general (and not just   downward 
causation) that will play a role in my discussion. The first is the requirement that the relata that 
figure in causal relations must be variables (which, I remind the reader, is my shorthand for what 
in the world is represented by variables). This is also a requirement that Elllis imposes, as 
reflected in the passages quoted above. Variables represent quantities or magnitudes (e.g., mass, 
charge, income) or, as a limiting case, whether some property is present or absent (represented 
by a binary variable taking the values 1 and 0.)  As this suggests,  one mark of a variable is that 
must be capable of taking at least two distinct values. This requirement might seem trivial but as 
we shall see, neglect of it (or failure to specify just what the relevant variables are) undermines 
some well - known criticisms of downward causation.  
A second generally accepted requirement on causation is that variables standing in causal 
relationships must be “distinct”—the intent here is to rule out cases in which variables stand in 
logical,  conceptual or state-space  relationships that exclude causation. For example (Lewis, 
2000), although whether or not I say “hello loudly” depends in some sense on whether or not I 
say ”hello”, this dependence is not causal dependence.  I will provide a characterization of the 
kind of distinctness that is necessary for causation below—condition IF, Section 5.  The 
relevance of this consideration to our discussion is that critics of downward causation frequently 
claim that this involves wholes acting downward on their parts and that wholes and parts are not 
sufficiently distinct to stand in causal relationships. (See e. g. Craver and Bechtel, 2007) I agree 
that at least in many cases wholes and their parts are not sufficiently distinct to stand in causal 
relationships but, as argued below, in other respects this criticism misfires. Scientifically 
plausible examples of downward causation do not involve wholes acting on parts but rather 
involve variables (as all causal relations do) and these need not stand in part/whole relationships, 
even when entities of which they are predicated do.   
 
3. Some Examples 
 
Recent papers and books by Ellis and co-authors and by others such as Denis Noble provide 
many prima-facie plausible examples of downward causation. (See also Clark and Lancaster, 
2017.)  Here are a few such examples, with some additions of my own. (Again, in saying that 
these are “prima-facie plausible” examples I do not mean that I’m going to simply assume  that 
these are genuine cases of downward causation. Rather, following the methodology outlined 
earlier, these are the kinds of cases that count as downward causation if any cases do and hence 
the kinds of cases on which we need to focus.)  
 
3.1) The use of mean field theories in which the combined action of many atoms on a 
single atom is represented by means of an effective potential V rather than by means of a 
representation of each individual atom and their interaction. Intuitively, V is a higher level than 
the atom on which it acts. (Ellis, 2016, Clark and Lancaster, 2017). 
  
3. 2) The influence of environmental variables including social relations between animals 
on gene expression as when manipulating the position of a monkey within a status hierarchy 
changes gene expression which controls serotonin levels within individual monkeys.  Here 
position within a social hierarchy is thought of (perhaps on the basis of compositional 
considerations) at a higher level than gene expression.    
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3.3) A red hot sword is plunged into cold water and this alters the meso -level structure of 
the steel in the sword—  cracks, dislocations, and grains that it contains. The treatment of the 
sword—heating and cooling—is at a higher level than these mesoscopic changes18 and the 
former downward causes the latter.  (Example due to Bob Batterman.)    
  
3. 4) Energy cascades. When a fluid is stirred in such a way that it exhibits large-scale 
turbulent motion this motion is gradually transferred to motion at smaller scales– from large 
scale eddies to much smaller scale eddies. The large-scale motion may be on the scale of many 
meters, the small-scale motions on the scale of a millimeter where they are eventually dissipated 
as heat. Viscosity related effects dominate at this smaller scale but are less important at larger 
scales. The stirring is an upper-level cause of the subsequent behavior of the fluid.  (Example due 
to Mark Wilson.)  
 
3.5) According to the Hodgkin- Huxley (HH) model,  a neuron generating an action 
potential may  be represented by a circuit in  parallel,  in which there is a potential difference V 
across the neuronal membrane  which functions as a capacitor. Embedded in the membrane are 
various sodium and potassium ion channels with time and voltage dependent conductances gNa, 
gK  which influence ionic currents through the membrane. V causally influences these 
conductances and currents which seem intuitively at a lower level than V. (Example discussed by 
Denis Noble,  2006.)  
 
In each of these cases the conditions for an intervention on the upper-level variable seem 
to be satisfied19.  First, the manipulations of the upper-level variables are not confounded by 
other variables that might affect the dependent variable independently of the intervention in a 
way that undermines the reliability of causal inferences. (Some writers -- e.g.,  Baumgartner, 
2010—hold that all manipulations of  upper-level variables are “confounded” by their lower 
level realizers but this is a tendentious and unmotivated  notion of confounding—see Section 7.) 
Second, the upper-level variables are multiply realized but it is plausible that their effects on the 
dependent variables are realization independent in the sense described in Section 2. For example, 
there are a variety of different ways of intervening on the mean field to set it to a particular value 
(with these corresponding to different arrangements of the many atoms making up this field) but 
as long as the value of the mean field is the same, the effect on the individual atom will be the 
same. In the case of 3.5, interventions on the membrane potential can be carried out by means of 
a voltage clamp (the device actually employed by Hodgkin and Huxley in carrying out their 
original experiment) which exogenously imposes a stable potential difference across the 
membrane. A particular value for this potential difference can be realized at a lower level by 
various combinations of charge carrying individual atoms and molecules in the membrane but to 
 
18 The heating and cooling affect the whole sword, not just components of it.  
19 Recall that according to M for causal claims to be true the interventionist account does not 
require that interventions actually occur but rather the truth of  the appropriate counterfactuals 
describing what would happen if interventions were to occur. However, in the examples 
described above, interventions are actually carried out to demonstrate downward causation—for 
example, position of a monkey within a status hierarchy is manipulated and the effect on its 
serotonin level observed.  
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the extent that the HH model is empirically correct, these different realizations will have the 
same uniform impact on lower-level variables such as the channel conductances.  
Although examples of the sort just described appear to be prima-facie plausible examples 
of downward causation, a number of scientists and philosophers have advanced objections to this 
concept.  In the next several sections (4- 7) I review and respond to several of these objections. 
 
4. Wholes and Parts.   
 
A very common criticism of the idea of downward causation is that this requires that 
“wholes” act downward on their “parts” and that the relation between a whole and its parts 
cannot be a causal relation of any kind. Two reasons (e.g., Craver and Bechtel, 2007) cited in 
support of this last claim are that (i) wholes and parts are not sufficiently distinct to stand in 
causal relations and (ii) the relation between wholes and parts is “synchronous”  while causal 
relationships are always “diachronic”,  where this is understood as meaning that effects must 
occur temporally after their causes. For example,  Craver and Bechtel, 2007  consider, as a  
putative example  of top-down causation, the claim  that  the overall process of visual signal 
transduction (from light falling on the retina to visual object recognition) causes changes in the 
components or parts of the transduction process such as  rod depolarization—i.e., that this whole 
temporally extended  process  causes the occurrence of its temporal components. They object 
that because rod depolarization is part of the overall transduction process, the latter cannot cause 
the former. More generally, they think of claims of downward causation as claims that the 
overall state or activity of a mechanism has instantaneous or synchronic causal effects on 
components of the mechanism—a notion that they find objectionable.    
 A basic problem with this line of argument is that plausible cases of downward 
causation, including the examples described in Section 3, do not take this whole to part form. 
One reason for this is that parts and wholes are (at least on the most natural interpretation of 
these notions) things or thing-like (where included in the latter category are temporally extended 
processes or, as some philosophers call them, “activities”). By contrast, as emphasized above, 
causal claims relate variables and at least in many cases these variables do not stand in part/ 
whole or containment or constitutive relationships. This is so even if it is true that the things of 
which these variables are predicated stand in part/whole relationships.  For example, in the case 
of the HH model, the putative top-down cause is not the whole process of the generation of the 
action potential. Rather the top-down cause is changes in the membrane potential V, a variable 
(more pedantically a magnitude represented by a variable), and among its effects are changes in 
the voltage-gated channel conductances, represented by the variables gna, gk . The ion channels, 
the conductances of which are described by gna, gk are indeed parts of neuronal membrane but it 
does not follow (indeed it is unclear what it would mean to say) that the conductances are 
themselves parts of the membrane potential difference20. More importantly, even if we think that 
 
20 Craver (2007) does provide a test for whether some activity or behavior is a “part” of another. 
This appeals to what Craver calls mutual manipulability (MM): when X and S are related as part 
and whole and F is an behavior of X and J a behavior of S, then F is a constituent or part of J iff     
 
(i) there is an intervention on X’s F-ing with respect to S’s J-ing that changes S’s J-ing; 
 
(ii) there is   intervention on S’s J-ing with respect to X’s F-ing that changes X’s F-ing (Craver, 
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there is a way of making sense of this parthood claim, it does not follow, for reasons described 
below, that the membrane potential and conductances fail to be distinct in a way that precludes 
their standing in a causal relationship.  
Similarly, when a heated sword is plunged into cold water, it is true that the meso-
structures affected are parts of the sword, but the relevant causal claim is not that the sword or its 
overall state causes these meso- structures to change instantaneously or that the temporally 
extended process consisting of plunging the sword followed by lower-level structural changes 
causes the temporal part consisting of the latter changes. Instead, the top-down cause in this case 
is the act of plunging the hot sword into the cold water which might be represented by a binary 
variable P which takes the values 1 or 0 depending on whether the sword is or is not plunged.  
Again, the meso-structure of the sword is not plausibly regarded as “part” of the variable P.  
Similarly, monkey 1 is (let us suppose) a “part” of the monkey band, and monkey 1’s 
serotonin level  is part of monkey 1 but the putative top down cause (and what is experimentally 
manipulated)  is the hierarchical structure of the band  and the putative effect (monkey 1’s 
serotonin level ) is not (at least in any obvious sense) part of that.  
These distinctions (between things or processes which have parts and variables which at 
least in the cases under discussion do not stand in part/whole relations) would not matter if 
whenever P is a part of whole W, variables predicated of P and W fail to be distinct in  a way (or 
have some other property)  that precludes their standing in causal relationships. However, as I 
shall now argue, this is not the case: as the examples in 3.5 illustrate, even if P is a part of W, it 
does not follow that variables predicated of P and W cannot stand in causal relationships.  
 
   5. Independent Fixability.  
 
The following condition is commonly assumed, often only implicitly, in the causal 
modeling literature for when variables are sufficiently distinct to stand in causal relationships.  I 
call it IF (for Independent Fixability) since it embodies the idea that variables are distinct if all of 
their values are independently fixable via interventions: 
 
(IF) Variables in set S are distinct in a way that permits their standing in causal 
relationships if and only it is “possible” to intervene on each variable independently, 
holding it fixed at each of its possible values (for  the units or systems those values 
 
2007 , p. 153).    
 
This is a test for whether activities/ behaviors rather than variables are parts of others, but putting 
this aside, MM is inadequate because it fails to distinguish genuine parthood relations from 
cyclic causal relations. For example if having a certain potential is a behavior then both (i) and 
(ii)  are satisfied with respect to the  relations between the potential and the  behavior of the 
channel conductances gna, gk. However, both the V to  gna, gk relation and the  gna, gk to V 
relations are causal rather than whole/part relations. (See Section 6  for remarks defending the 
claim that  causal relations can be cyclic.) As argued in Section 5, the feature of a part/whole 
relation that precludes causation is a failure of independent fixability. This is present in Lewis 
example of the relation between saying “hello” and saying hello “loudly” but not in the case of 
the relation between V and gna, gk 
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characterize) while intervening to hold the other variables to each of their other possible 
values. In other words, all possible combinations of values of different variables in the set 
must be “compossible”21.  Here “possible” includes settings of values of variables that are 
possible in terms of the assumed  logical, mathematical, or semantic relations among the 
variables as well as certain structural or space-state relationships. 
 
As an illustration, consider an example from Lewis (1986) concerning of the relationship 
between N’s saying “hello” and saying “hello” loudly. Let H be a variable that takes the values 0 
or 1, depending on whether or not N says “hello”. Let L be a variable that takes values 0, 1 or 2 
depending on whether N does not say hello”, says “hello” but not loudly, or says “hello” loudly. 
Then certain combinations of these variables such as H=0 and L=2 are impossible for conceptual 
reasons and IF is violated. Thus, as Lewis claims,  the relationship between H and L is not a 
causal relationship. As another  illustration, the variables in {HDL, LDL and TC}  are 
conceptually connected and fail the independent fixability condition: Given, e.g., values for HDL 
and LDL, there are values for TC that are ruled out for mathematical or conceptual reasons, since 
TC is defined as the sum of HDL and LDL. This is reflected in the fact that it would be 
misguided to claim that HDL and LDL cause TC For similar reasons, IF is violated for upper and 
lower level variables that stand in realization relations—a variable (with n-tuples as values) 
representing the kinetic energies of all of the individual molecules in a gas cannot cause its 
temperature (or conversely.)  
Fortunately to apply IF to the putative examples of downward causation in 3.5, we do not 
need to make problematic judgments about logical or conceptual possibility. In each case, the 
possibility of independent fixability is shown by the fact that experiments have actually been 
performed (or might readily be performed) that set the values of the variables claimed to be 
causally related independently of each other. For example, in the experiments which provided 
the basis for the HH model, the newly invented voltage clamp allowed the experimenters to set 
the value of V exogenously in a way that was independent of the channel conductances.  
Similarly, the channel conductances  can be manipulated independently of V  by molecular 
agents. In the case of 3.2, the status position of a monkey can be changed by placing him in a 
new band and observing whether there are changes in his serotonin level.  Also the serotonin 
level of the monkey can be manipulated independently by pharmacological means. These 
possible experiments reflect the fact that the variables in the relationships  3.1-3.5 do not seem to 
be logically or conceptually connected in  a way that precludes their standing in causal 
relationships.   
Another concern expressed by Craver and Bechtel, 2007, as well as other writers, is that 
putative relationships of downward causation are synchronic while legitimate causal relations are 
diachronic, with the cause temporally preceding the effect. Again this concern seems to derive 
from the mistaken assumption that downward causal relationships are whole to part 
relationships, where these are understood as obtaining instantaneously or at single moment. In 
fact the general claim causes must always temporally precede their effects is far from obviously 
correct but it is not necessary to argue for this here, since the examples  3.1- 3.5 all seem to 
 
21 On the other hand, different values of the same variable are not compossible for the same 
object or system, in the sense that such different values  cannot hold for the same object  —e.g., 
the same object cannot have a mass of both 5 and 10 kg. Of course different objects can have 
different masses, and the velocity of any object can be set independently of its mass.  
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involve diachronic causation, although this fact may not be represented in the way those 
relationships are modeled or described. For example, as an empirical matter, there is presumably 
a very short temporal delay between the momentary value of the membrane potential or its time 
derivative and the response of the ion channels, although this fact is not represented in the HH 
model, since it does not matter to the effects that the model is intended to explain.  Similarly the 
response of the monkey’s serotonin levels to a change in status presumably also does not occur 
instantaneously but rather takes time. If, like Craver and Bechtel, one understands part/whole 
relationships as those that obtain  at a given instant, such relations are indeed “synchronous”  but 
this is just further reason to think that examples involving such relations are very different from 
the relationships described in 3.1-3.5 and not plausible candidates for  causal relations of any 
kind.22    
 
6. Cycles.  
 
Another concern about downward causation that appears in Craver and Bechtel, 2007 is 
this: it appears that countenancing downward causation in a system leads, in many cases, to 
countenancing causal cycles in that system, in the sense that at some level of representation we 
have X causing Y which in turn causes X (perhaps via some intermediate variables). Craver and 
Bechtel claim that such cycles are problematic—  because (among other considerations) they are  
inconsistent with the “asymmetry” of casual relationships23. The claim that in a number of 
cases24 systems in which downward causation is present will also be systems in which cycles are 
 
22 It is worth noting that the examples Craver and Bechtel discuss appear to be ones they have 
made up—they don’t cite anyone in the scientific literature who treats their examples as cases of 
downward causation. 
23 An anonymous referee suggests this may be a misunderstanding on my part since in 
subsequent papers (e.g., 2017) Bechtel does discuss causal cycles. But in their (2007) Craver and 
Bechtel are unambiguous that they think that downward causation as they conceive it is 
problematic because it seems to involve causal cycles:   
…the possibility of bottom-up and top-down influence ‘propagated’ simultaneously 
across levels results in problematic causal circles. For example, one might believe that if 
an object, X, has its causal powers in virtue of possessing a property, P, then if X is to 
exercise its powers at time t, X must possess P at t. And one might believe further that if 
something causes X to acquire P at t, then x does not already possess P at t until that 
something has acted. If X’s acquiring P at t is a cause of S’s having w at t, and S’s having 
w at t is a cause of X’s having P at t, then it appears that X’s acquiring P at t cannot cause 
S to have w until S’s having w causes X to acquire P. In that case, it is little wonder that 
talk of interlevel causation strikes us as mysterious. (552-3). 
I will not speculate about how to reconcile these remarks with Bechtel’s later remarks regarding 
causal cycles in mechanisms.  
 
24 This is not true for all examples involving downward causation as shown by 3.3 and 3.5.  
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present seems correct. For example, as we have noted, in the case of the HH model, the 
membrane potential causally influences the channel conductances but it is also the case that those 
conductances, by influencing ion flow, in turn influence the membrane potential.  Similarly, 
although status position influences serotonin levels, it is also the case that serotonin levels 
influence status, as is shown when the former is exogenously manipulated.  
Causal representations involving cycles raise a number of subtle interpretive issues that I 
lack the space (and competence) to address. However let me make the following brief points: 
 
6.1. The presence of causal cycles is a real feature of many biological systems and for 
obvious reasons—such cycles are an unavoidable part of feedback and control 
mechanisms that are ubiquitous in such systems and are necessary for restoring systems to 
an equilibrium from which they may have departed, avoiding runaway behavior etc. 
Cycles are also a common feature of many social and economic systems. We don’t want 
conditions on causation that have the consequence that such cycles are impossible. 
 
6.2. One possible strategy for avoiding cycles is to distinguish variables by assigning them 
different temporal indices: the membrane potential at time t (Vt) causally influences the 
conductances at time t+ d, which in turn influence the membrane potential at time t + 2d  
represented by a distinct (V t+ 2d) and so  on. I will not pursue the question of whether this 
strategy is always appropriate but it is one way of replacing cycles with non-cyclic 
systems. 
 
6.3. Representations involving causal cycles (that is, that do not employ the indexing 
strategy described under 6.2) are common in the causal modeling literature (these are so- 
called non-recursive models) and in disciplines like economics. It is not obvious that 
there is anything incoherent (or inconsistent with the “nature” of causation) in the use of 
such models, even if we think that underlying them at some finer-grained level of 
analysis is an acyclic model. In thinking about representations with cycles, we should 
distinguish the issue of whether they postulate relations that have a “direction” from 
whether causal cycles are possible; directionality is  arguably a feature of any causal 
relationship, in the sense that we haven’t specified the relationship until we have 
specified a direction and that X  Y is a different relation from Y  X. However, this does 
not preclude cycles. In a causal graph in which X Y  and Y  X appears, the graph is 
directed (rather than undirected, as would be the case if we had instead written X--Y)  
reflecting the fact that there is a causal relation is from X to Y as well as from Y to X but a 
cycle is present. In other words, we need to distinguish directedness from acyclicity:  
there can be directed cyclic graphs as well as directed acyclic graphs.  A simple 
interpretation for such a directed cyclic graph (which will fit some applications but 
perhaps not all) is this: There is an intervention on X that will change Y and an 
intervention on Y that will change X.  This seems to fit the examples in section 3 in which 
there are apparent causal cycles—intervening on status changes serotonin levels and 
intervening on serotonin levels changes status and so on. There does not seem to be 
anything incoherent about such an interpretation.  
 
7. Causal Exclusion. 
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Another objection to the notion of downward causation appeals to causal exclusion 
arguments. Suppose, as before, that U1 and U2 are upper-level variables  and L1 and L2 are 
lower-level variables with L1 realizing U1 and L2 realizing U2. L1 causes L2.    An iconic 
diagram due to Kim (e.g., 2005),  represents these the realization relations by means of a thick 
vertical arrow and the causal relation by means of a thin horizontal arrow:   
 
         U1                          U2 
 
 
                                        
 




The question is then whether there can be (whether it makes sense to suppose that there 
are) other causal relationships in this structure; for example, between U1 and U2 or between U1 
and L1 (the latter being a case of “downward causation”). According to the causal exclusion 
argument the answer to this question is “no” and thus downward causation (as well as upper- 
level causation from U1 to U2) is impossible.  A number of different but closely related 
arguments are invoked in support of this conclusion. Here is one: (i) Assume for simplicity that 
the lower-level causal relation is deterministic. Because of the realization relation, a change in 
the value of U1 must involve a change in the value of L1.  Suppose that under this change there 
is an accompanying change in the value of L2. (If there are no changes in the value of L2 that 
accompanies changes in the value of U1/L1, then U1 doesn’t cause L2 and it also does not cause 
U2.) This change in the value of L2 under a change in L1 shows that L1 causes L2. Moreover 
(according to this version of the exclusion argument) this change in L2 is” entirely due” to the 
change in L1, so that there is no “causal work left over for U1 to do” when it comes to L2 (or 
U2).  In other words, U1 appears to be causally inert with respect to L2 once the role of L1 is 
taken into account.   
A related argument (ii) claims that countenancing downward causation from U1 to L2 
commits us to an implausible and unnecessary claim about causal overdetermination: if 
downward causation was present we would have both U1 and L1 causing L2.  Not only does this 
seem “counterintuitive” according to critics, postulating such overdetermination seems 
unnecessary, since as we have seen, any effect on L2 seems to be fully accounted for by L1 
alone—postulating a causal influence from U1 to L2 is (it is claimed) superfluous or redundant.  
Finally, (iii) suppose we want to determine whether U1 has a causal impact on L2. To do 
this, we must, according to advocates of the exclusion argument, “control for” the causal 
influence of other causes of L2 besides U1—it is only if U1 influences L2 holding fixed (that is 
conditioning on) or accounting for the influence of these other causes, that we can conclude that 
U1 causes L2. But among the “other causes” of L2 is L1 and once we control for the influence of 
L1 on L2, we see that U1 has no further or additional effect on L2 – indeed, given the value of 
L1, any further variation  in U1 (which might be responsible for any additional effect of U1) is 
impossible (cf. Baumgartner, 2010).   
I have discussed these arguments elsewhere (e.g.,  Woodward, 2015).  Here I will be 
brief: on my view, they rest on misunderstandings about how to think about causal relationships 
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when non-causal determination relationships (like the realization relation between L1 and U1) 
are also present.  Let me begin with version (iii) of the exclusion argument, since the mistake 
here is perhaps most obvious. Suppose that we have a structure  S* (figure 2, with the thin 
arrows representing causal relations)  in which, in contrast to the structure S in  Figure 1, L1 
causes (and thus does not realize)  U1  and in addition L1 causes L2 which causes U2.  In this 
case  U1 and L2 will be correlated as will U1 and U2.  In cases of this sort in determining 
whether U1 causes L2 (or U2), it is indeed entirely appropriate to control for the influence of L1 
on L2: U1 causes L2 only if , taking into account the influence of L1 on L2, U1 has an additional 
independent effect on L2.  If the correct structure is what is represented in the diagram, when one 
controls for L1, U1 will not be correlated with L2 or U2, showing the absence of a causal 
connection.  
 




L1         L2 
 
Figure 2:  Causal Structure S* 
 
The basic mistake made by defenders of the exclusion argument is to suppose that we are 
entitled to reason in the same way when the causal relationship between L1 and U1 in Figure 2 is 
replaced with a non-causal determination relation like realization as in Figure 1, so that the same 
test for whether U1 causally influences L2 is appropriate in both cases.  In fact the two situations, 
S and S* are fundamentally disanalogous. For one thing, in situation S*  the relevant 
counterfactual has a possibly true  antecedent, indeed one that may be experimentally realizable:   
one holds fixed the value of L1, manipulates U1 independently (it follows from IF that this will 
be possible in principle if the relationship between L1 and U1 is causal or correlational, as in S*, 
and not one of non-causal dependence) and then sees whether there is any uniform  change in the 
value of L2—this is the appropriate criterion for whether U1 has a causal influence on L2. 
(Parallel remarks apply to whether U1 causes U2.) If it turns out that there is no regular 
association between U1 and L2 in this circumstance, this does indeed allow one to conclude that 
U1 is causally inert with respect to L2.  But in situation S the corresponding counterfactual has, 
by hypothesis, an “impossible” antecedent: because of the nature of the realization relation, it is 
impossible to hold fixed the value of L1 while performing interventions that change the value of 
U1 and seeing what changes may be associated with these. This is an indication that the use of 
this counterfactual is the wrong test or criterion for whether U1 has a causal influence on L2. Put 
differently, in situation S* the conclusion that U1 is causally inert follows if it is possible to vary 
U1 while P1 is fixed and there is no corresponding change in L2. In situation S , the claim of the 
exclusion argument is, in effect, that the causal inertness of U1 with respect to L2 follows from 
the impossibility of varying U1 while L1 is held fixed25. This relies on a  condition for causal 
inertness that is completely different from the condition employed in connection with S*: a 
 
25 Recall that the interventionist condition for causation (M) requires that there exist  possible 
interventions on X such that…. . Thus cases involving impossible interventions correspond to 
false causal claims.  
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condition that is not supported by (is not a reasonable extension of ) ordinary considerations 
about what it is appropriate to control for when only ordinary causal relationships and no  
relations of non-causal determination are present26. Note also that the characterization of 
interventions on upper-level variables when they have lower- level realizers in Section 2 avoids 
the problem just described concerning inappropriate control because according to that 
characterization an intervention that changes an upper-level variable  at the same time  is  
accompanied by some change in the lower-level realizer of that variable. That is, when we 
intervene on U1 the upshot of that very intervention is also some  change in L1 that, whatever it 
may be, is  consistent with the change in U1. This ensures that, assuming  U1 has a uniform or 
realization independent  effect on some second variable Y (upper or lower level), this must be 
consistent with any change in Y due to the change in  L1. In other words when we intervene on 
U1 we just let L1 change in whatever way it does consistent with the intervention and this gives 
us the effect if any on Y.  
Another, related way of bringing out why it is inappropriate to control for L1 in assessing 
whether U1 causes L1 or U2 in cases in which L1 and L2 are realizers of L1 and L2   appeals to 
the underlying rationale for  such control – what we are trying to accomplish when we control 
for potential confounders. Suppose, to take a concrete example, that we are interested in whether 
administration A of a drug X causes recovery R from an illness. To answer this question it is not 
enough to observe whether there is a correlation between A and R. It might be the case that the 
drug was preferentially given to those with very strong immune systems (S)  and that this has an 
effect on recovery that is independent of the drug. To show that A causes R, we need to rule out 
such possibilities. We can do so either by means of a randomized controlled experiment in which 
the possible confounding influence of S is eliminated by the experimental design or, if the study 
is observational, by measuring S and conditionalizing on (controlling for) it. One obvious 
motivation for doing this is that if the correlation between A and R is entirely due to S, then when 
we give the drug to those without strong immune systems this correlation will disappear. Thus 
we will be misled if we attempt to use the drug to promote recovery in a population with this 
different value of S. Note that this is a real worry because it is entirely possible to give someone 
the drug without that person having a strong immune system.   
 Call the randomized experiment described above experiment one and suppose that when 
we do it we do get convincing evidence that A causes R. Now contrast this with the following 
possibility which I will call scenario two.  Professor Exclusion observes that drug X has 
microstructure Q  and  objects to experiment one on the following grounds: in assessing the 
possible causal influence of A, the experimenters failed to control for Q which is also a cause of 
recovery (or at least of whatever microlevel facts “underlie” recovery. ) Professor Exclusion 
argues that it is plausible that A has no causal influence on R “over and above” the influence of 
Q, and concludes from this that A does not cause R. I think it is obvious that Professor 
Exclusion’s worry is completely different from the worry that S might be a confounding 
 
26 Another way of putting this point is that a graph like that in Figure 1, in which realization 
relations are represented, is not a causal graph (that is a graph in which all arrows represent 
causal relationships) in the sense in which such graphs are understood in, e.g., Pearl, 2000, 
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000 and Woodward, 2003. Instead it is a  “mixed” graph in 
which both causal relations and non-causal (e.g. supervenience relations) are present. Such 
mixed graphs require different rules for characterizing the effects of interventions and what 
needs to be controlled for in order to “see” causal relationships.  
 20 
influence that is addressed in experiment one.  First, unlike experiment one that addresses the 
possible confounding role of S,  there is no possible experiment  that consists of controlling for Q 
while varying A. Second, as noted above if the association between A and R in experiment one is 
entirely due to S, then that association will disappear when the drug is given to those with weak 
immune systems—that is, when there is a change in the value of the confounding variable S. In 
contrast nothing like this is possible under scenario two. The relationship between drug X and its 
microstructure Q is unbreakable—you don’t have to worry that, you might be in a situation  in 
which although you administer X, its alleged confounder Q is absent. In other words the kind of 
concern about the consequences of confounding which is addressed in the first experiment just 
isn’t a concern in the second scenario. This suggests in turn that there is no obvious motivation 
for treating Q as a potential confounder that needs to be controlled for. To be sure, from 
Professor Exclusion’s perspective  when you fail to conclude that A is causally inert you make a 
mistake, but the point is that this alleged mistake has no further consequences you should care 
about—it doesn’t imply that you will be mistaken about which relationships support 
manipulation and control, what will happen when you manipulate A and so on.  On the contrary, 
from a functionalist perspective you make a mistake when you control for Q since this 
mistakenly leads you to conclude that  A does not cause R, hence that manipulating A is not a 
way of changing R, when, supposing that interventions are understood along the lines described 
above, there is a manipulation-supporting relationship between A and R.    
  To this we may add the following consideration: in the argument immediately above I 
focused on the use of an exclusion argument to criticize downward causation. But of course if 
the considerations in the various versions of the exclusion argument are cogent at all, they appear 
to apply not just to downward causation claims but to all claims that attribute causal efficacy to 
upper-level variables as long as these variables are not identical with lower level variables--  that 
is, all claims according to which upper level causes cause upper-level effects (at the same level) 
turn out to be false to be false as well, under the assumption of non-reductive physicalism.  
Needless to say, the conclusion that there is no causation at all involving upper-level variables is 
a difficult one to swallow—it is reasonable to suspect that something may be wrong with 
premises that lead to this conclusion, which is what I have suggested27. 
What about the overdetermination argument? Again this seems to trade on a misleading 
analogy (or assumption of similarity between) ordinary cases of overdetermination in which the 
variables involved do not stand in any non-causal determination relations) and a (very different) 
kind of “overdetermination” which may occur when such non-causal determination relations are 
 
27 Put slightly differently,  the defender of the exclusion argument seems to claim that built into 
our notion of causation is a requirement to control for lower-level realizing variables (or at least 
that we ought to adopt a notion of causation that has this feature).  This in turn has the 
consequence that, under the assumption of non- reductive physicalism,  upper-level variables are 
always causally inert, thus depriving the notion of causation  of much of its usefulness since it 
follows that there are no true upper-level claims, completely independently of any empirical 
investigation. An obvious question is why we would have developed (and continue to use)  a 
notion of causation with this perverse feature  One obvious response is that our notion either 
does not have this feature.  Alternatively, one might think that if it does, it should replaced with a 
notion that does not have this feature. In fact, recent psychological experiments (Blanchard et al., 
forthcoming) seem to show that ordinary people do not employ notions of causation that behave 
in accord with exclusionist assumptions. 
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present. Consider an ordinary case of overdetermination in which two riflemen both 
simultaneous shoot (S1, S2) a victim through the heart with each shot being causally sufficient 
for death (D). In such a case we may assume that the following counterfactuals are true28:  
 
7.1.  If S1 had not occurred but S2 had occurred, D would have occurred 
 
      7.2.   If S2 had not occurred but S1 had occurred, D would have occurred 
 
These counterfactuals capture an important part of what makes this an ordinary case of 
overdetermination. Note that the antecedents of both counterfactuals are possible—one of the 
riflemen might have decided not to shoot while the other does. By contrast consider a case like 
that in Figure 1 in which U1= u11   is realized by L1=l11 and we are interested in how U1 and 
L1 relate causally to L2 which we assume takes value  l22. 
The  counterfactuals that correspond to (7.1-7.2 ) are: 
 
7.3.  If U1= u11 and L1   l11, then L2= l22 
 
         7.4.  If U1   u11 and L1 = l11, then L2= l22. 
 
 The antecedent of (7.3) is possible (since U1 is multiply realizable and hence might have 
been realized by some other value of L1 besides l11). However (7.3) will not be true if there is 
a realizer of U1 (different from l11) which does not cause L2=l22.  By contrast the antecedent 
of (7.4) is not possible. These differences between (7.1-2) and (7.3-4) reflect the fact that even 
if want to describe the case in which L1 realizes U1 as a case of overdetermination, it involves 
is a very different kind of overdetermination than is present in the riflemen case.  Ordinary 
cases of overdetermination like the riflemen case are relatively rare and involve either 
“coincidences” or require the operation of some additional (ordinary) causal structure (e.g., an 
order from the commander to both riflemen to fire) the presence of which is contingent. This is 
why we don’t think that such ordinary overdetermination is ubiquitous. By contrast the 
connection between L1=l11 and U1= u11 when the former realizes the latter is not a 
coincidence and not the result of some additional co-ordinating causal structure. This second 
sort of “overdetermination” is secured by the presence of the realization relation and for that 
reason it is both common and unmysterious. The argument that there is something puzzling or 
problematic about this second kind of overdetermination seems to rely on wrongly assimilating 
it to the first kind of overdetermination29   
 
28 These counterfactuals should of course be interpreted in an interventionist, non- backtracking 
manner.  
29 In thinking about overdetermination and “extra” arrows, it is also important to distinguish the 
question of which causal relations exist in nature from the question of which causal relations one 
needs to represent in a particular graph or other representational structure. Consider the usual 
case in which L1 causes L2 and L1, L2 realize U1 and U2, with U1 having a uniform effect on 
U2.  If  what we are interested in is explaining  U2, we may legitimately decide to employ a 
graph in which there are no arrows from U1 to L2 or from L1 to U2 even if the effects are 
uniform.  The reason for this is that the difference-making information in which we are interested 
is fully absorbed into the arrow from U1 to U2 – see Section 8.  When we omit the arrows from 
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Finally, let me comment briefly on the argument that the postulation of downward (or 
indeed any upper-level causal relation) is superfluous or redundant, given the lower-level 
causal relationships.  (This is in anticipation of some additional discussion in Section 8.) There 
is an obvious sense in which this claim of superfluousness is misleading, at least in the context 
of a situation like that described by Figure 1. The reason for this is that downward causation 
(or upper-level causation of upper-level effects) requires satisfaction of the conditions in 
Section 2 and these (and particularly the uniformity of effect requirement) are highly non-
trivial. In particular, if L1 causes L2 and  U1 is realized by L1 and U2 by L2, it does not follow 
that U1 has a homogeneous or uniform effect on L2 (or on U2). Indeed  if   L1 causes  L2,  then 
in the generic case, most ways of constructing upper level variable  U1 that involves coarse-
graining L1 will not yield variables that have a uniform causal effect on L2 or on  some U2  
constructed by coarse-graining L230. In other words, given a diagram like Kim’s, in which L1 
causes L2, it is wrong to think that if one countenances causation by upper-level variables  at 
all, it follows automatically from the fact that L1 realizes U1 and L2 realizes U2  that one 
should draw additional  arrows indicating causal relationships from U1 to L2 or from U1 to U2. 
Again, one is entitled to do this only if  the conditions described in Section 2  are met for these 
relationships.  Thus when these conditions are met and on this basis we add arrows from U1 to 
L1 and/or from U1 to U2, we are adding information to Figure 1 that does not follow just from 
the information in the lower half of the diagram — thus information that is not superfluous or 
redundant.   
 
    8. Conditional Causal Independence31.  
 
So far I have characterized a notion of downward causation, described some examples 
that I claim illustrate downward causation, and attempted to respond to several objections. 
However, an adequate defense of downward causation needs to do more than this; in particular, 
it would be desirable to have a more positive account of the work that is done by this notion—
why it is a useful and fruitful notion in causal analysis, rather than, as critics claim,  a 
dispensable and potentially confusing one32. In what follows I attempt to provide such an 
account, which appeals to a notion that I will call conditional causal independence. This will help 
us to better understand the worldly information that causal claims involving upper-level variables 
track.   
 
U1 to L2 or from L1 to U2 this need not be interpreted as claims that these causal relations do not 
exist; instead we have just declined to represent them.   
30 Note that even if U1 has a uniform effect on upper - level variable U2 it need not have a 
uniform effect on some lower-level variable L2 that realizes U2.  Suppose that the exact 
molecular state of a gas at time t, described by L1, causes its exact molecular state  L2 at some 
later time t+d, with L1 realizing some upper level variable U1, e.g., temperature, at t. U1 will not 
count as a cause of L2 because it does not have a uniform effect on this variable, even  though it 
may have a uniform effect on some upper level thermodynamic variable U2 that  is realized by 
L2.  
31 Here I want to acknowledge the influence of very similar ideas in Chalupka et al., 2017.  
32 Again, this follows from the idea that we want a “functional” account of causation—an 
account that shows how it is useful to think about causation in the way we do.  
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Suppose, as before, that we have an upper-level variable U the values of which are 
multiply realized by a lower level variable L (or set of these, but, as before, to simplify things I 
will assume that there is a single L)  so that the L  has a  higher dimensionality than U . Let us 
say that L is unconditionally causally relevant to (alternatively, causally irrelevant to or 
independent of) some effect E if there are some (no) changes in the values of L  when produced 
by interventions that are associated with changes in E. (Thus unconditional causal relevance is 
what is captured by the interventionist criterion for causation M). Say that  L is  causally  
irrelevant to (or independent of) E conditional on U  if L is unconditionally causally relevant to 
E,  U  is unconditionally causally relevant to E, and conditional on the values of  U, changes in 
the value of the  L  produced  by additional interventions and consistent with these values for   U   
irrelevant to  E . In other words, we are to imagine a situation in which in which U and L are 
causally relevant to E, U is set to some value u1 via an intervention and then L is set via 
independent interventions to various values that are consistent with this value U=u1. If under 
such variations in L for fixed U, the value of E does not change, L is causally independent of E 
conditional on U33. For example, conditional on the setting of the temperature of a dilute gas to 
some value T= t, further variations in the kinetic energies of the individual molecules of the gas 
 
33 Some additional clarificatory remarks may be helpful. First, in contrast to the more familiar 
notion of conditional independence in probability theory, the notion of causal conditional 
independence is formulated in terms or interventionist counterfactuals—these rather than 
conditional probabilities provide the appropriate framework for understanding causal notions. 
Second note that we are not considering counterfactuals of the form: ”If L= l1 and U  were  = u2,  
where l1 is not a realizer of u2, then….”  As noted earlier such counterfactuals have impossible 
antecedents. Rather we are considering counterfactuals whose antecedents are, so to speak, the 
other way around, with the value u1 of U fixed  and the L- realizers of  that value u1 allowed to 
vary.  These counterfactuals do have possible antecedents. Third, researchers who adopt the 
Stalnaker-Lewis closeness of possible world framework for evaluating counterfactuals 
sometimes argue as follows:  Suppose that in the actual world,  U takes the value u1, which is 
realized by L=l1, one of many possible realizers of U (the others being l2, l3…). Suppose we 
then consider a counterfactual whose antecedent is (1) “If L did not take the value l1, then…”  It 
is then claimed that the possible world which is closest to the actual world in which the 
antecedent of (1) holds is one in which some other realizer of U= u1 obtains (that is, a world in 
which one of L=l2 or L=l3 etc. holds instead) and  the counterfactual is evaluated accordingly.  
(Something like this idea is adopted in List and Menzies, 2009 to argue that true upper-level 
causal claims can exclude causal claims involving their lower-level realizers --- so called 
downward exclusion.) The framework described above does not rest on any such assumptions 
about closeness of worlds dictating which values of L would occur if l1 did not occur. Instead, 
we consider counterfactuals whose antecedents correspond to combinations of interventions 
where we specify exactly what is realized by those interventions rather than relying on closeness 
considerations to dictate what happens under those antecedents. (For a recent account of 
counterfactuals that exhibits these features see Briggs, 2012.) Thus when we consider 
counterfactuals like:  if (i) we were to set U=u1 and independently of this (ii) set L to some other 
value (e.g. l2), different from l1  where  l1 is the actual realizer of u1 but l2  is also  a realizer of 
u1, we are not supposing that l2 would have been realized if l1 hadn’t been. We are instead 
thinking in terms of a counterfactual the antecedent of which describes two separate operations, 
one of which sets U=u1 and the other of which sets L=l2.  
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as measured by some variable K when these variations are consistent with T=t will have the 
same effect (to a very high level of approximation) on other thermodynamic variables E such as 
pressure. Thus conditional on T, further variations in K are causally independent of such Es.  
Similarly, consider different lower-level ways L= l1, l2, l3… of realizing the same value of the 
membrane potential V in the HH model—these might correspond to slightly different 
distributions of charges in the membrane. Then we can interpret the HH model as claiming that 
conditional on the value of V (realized by an intervention), further variation in L whether V is 
realized by l1 or l2 or.. makes no difference to the channel conductances, so L is conditionally 
independent of these effects, conditional on the value of V. 
   When such a conditional independence relationship holds, U will of course have a 
uniform effect on E, regardless of how U is realized, and since by hypothesis E changes under 
some interventions on U, if E is a lower-level variable, U will meet the conditions in Section 2 
for being a downward cause of E. One way of thinking about this is that under these conditions 
all of the information in the lower-level variable L that makes a difference for E is absorbed into 
the upper level variable U so that to the extent that explaining E is a matter of exhibiting those 
factors that make a difference for E, U does just a good a job in this respect as L.  This justifies 
us in appealing to  U  as a cause of E.  A similar analysis holds when E is an upper level variable.  
This account has several additional features that are worth underscoring. Note first that 
we are assuming that L is unconditionally relevant to E as is U. Within the interventionist 
framework, this means that both U and L cause E so that, as remarked above (see footnote 32), 
we  reject downward exclusion. The resulting “redundancy” is unproblematic, for reasons 
described in Section 7.  
A closely related point is that when a conditional independence relation of the sort 
described holds (with L being independent of U conditional on E) this by itself does not license 
the claim that upper-level causal claim provides a “better” explanation than the lower level 
claim. Rather what is licensed is the weaker claim that the upper-level explanation is just as good 
as the lower-level explanation as far as E is concerned—just as good because it captures all of 
the relevant difference-making information for E that is provided by L. This contrasts with the 
idea  (accepted by many philosophers and some scientist who regard upper-level causal claims as 
legitimate) that the upper-level explanation in terms of U  is superior to the  lower-level 
explanation. This claim may be correct but it requires some additional argument for superiority.   
          Another point to keep in mind is that conditional causal independence relations are always 
relative to some target explanandum or effect E. That is, L might be conditionally causally 
independent of E1, given U but L might not be conditionally causally independent of some other 
explanandum E2 given U. For example, there are many features of neuronal behavior which are 
dependent on the lower level details of exactly how charge is distributed along the neuronal 
membrane (again see Herz et al., 2006), even if this is not true for the effects described by the 
HH model.  
 
9. The Role of Epistemic Factors 
 
Considerations involving conditional independence of the sort just described can be 
invoked to explain why it is permissible or legitimate to formulate causal claims in terms of 
upper-level variables, including causal claims that involve lower-level variables as effects— 
when conditional causal independence holds we may lose little or nothing, in terms of 
difference-making information, by doing so.  However, there is a crucial additional element to 
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the story about why we actually employ such upper-level variables.  This has to do with the   
various sorts of limitations that we humans (and perhaps all bounded agents) face. Some of these 
are calculational or computational -- we can’t solve the 1023 body problem of calculating bottom 
up from the behavior of individual molecules to the aggregate behavior of the gas. Nor can we 
make the kinds of fine-grained measurements that would be required for such calculations to 
reach reliable results.  Similarly, in the case of neuronal modeling, although there are more fine-
grained models that describe the behavior of small individual “compartments” of the neuron , 
these cannot be simply “aggregated up” to produce a tractable model of the whole neuron (Again 
see Herz et al. 2006).  We thus find that not only is it permissible to formulate theories in terms 
of upper level variables if we wish to explain certain explananda but that we have no alternative 
to doing so if we want models that are tractable or that we can calculate with. Put differently, we 
are very fortunate that nature presents us with relations of conditional irrelevance/independence 
of the sort I have been describing that we can exploit because otherwise scientific understanding 
of much or all of nature would be impossible.  When we build models and theories that exploit 
these opportunities, we have models and theories in which upper level causation appears.    
 
10. An Objection.  
 
The ideas just defended are likely to prompt the following objection among reduction-
minded critics. The objection is that on a view like mine top-down causation (and for that matter 
upper-level causation of upper-level effects) does not turn out to be “really real”—instead use of 
top-down causal claims just reflects shortcuts, approximations, idealizations etc. that scientists 
make for “pragmatic” reasons, like getting numbers out of their models, with genuine causation 
always occurring at a lower-level.  Following this line of argument, it might be observed that in 
the HH model the neuron itself is composed of atoms and molecules which interact locally, 
mainly through the electromagnetic force. The membrane potential, the channel conductances 
and so on is thus the upshot or resultant of complex patterns of interaction among these atomic 
and molecular constituents. It follows, according to the argument we are considering, that V, the 
channel conductances and other variables in the HH model do not represent anything “over and 
above” these atomic constituents and their interactions. Similarly for the other putative examples 
of downward causation described above. We may be forced to talk in terms of causation by 
upper-level variables because of our computational and epistemic limitations, but (the objection 
goes)  this just reflects something about us, not anything that is “out there” in the world or 
anything having to do with  “what nature is really like”.  
There a number of things that might be said in response to this objection, many of which 
I lack the space to discuss. But one relevant consideration is this: the “world” and “what nature is 
like” do enter importantly into the account of downward causation that I have presented. That 
certain variables L are conditionally causally independent (or nearly so) of other variables E, 
given the values of other variables U is a fact about what the world is like, and not a fact about us 
or what we are able know or do. I see no reason to hold that facts about conditional 
independence are somehow unreal or in some way lacking in “objectivity”. The way we should 
think about their status is not that our interests or limitations (or our willingness to employ 
pragmatic shortcuts) somehow create these facts about conditional causal independence. Rather 
the obtaining of these facts presents us with opportunities to formulate models and causal claims 
with certain structures (including those that contain claims of top-down causation) and which 
allow us to carry out calculations and construct derivations that would otherwise be impossible.    
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 Another way of bringing out the role of these facts about conditional independence is to   
note that they are, so to speak effaced, if we focus only on derivations of particular token 
explananda from lower-level theory. To illustrate, consider a wildly counterfactual scenario34 in 
which we are somehow able to deduce, from detailed information about the positions and 
momentum of each of the individual molecules making up a particular sample of gas  and the 
fundamental laws governing their interactions—call this M1--  facts about the temperature and 
pressure of the gas, E.  This deduction  -- call it D-- by itself  will not tell us  which other 
microstates of the gas  besides M1  would have led to E and which would have led instead to 
different values for the temperature and pressure. This last is information about conditional 
independence relationships and it is not apparent if we focus just on D.  Of course, if we were 
somehow also able to derive for each possible set of values for the positions and momenta of the 
individual molecules, facts about the resulting temperature and pressure (i.e., if we could 
construct and survey all derivations of form D for all microstates of the gas), then this would tell 
us which microstates of the gas lead to E and which would lead to other values for the 
temperature and pressure. In this sense (it might be argued) information about the relevant 
conditional causal independence relations is “contained in” the representation provided by the 
lower-level theory, and, to repeat an earlier objection, not something that is “over and above” 
what is in this theory35.  
  I accept this last claim, at least as far as the kind of realization relation on which I have 
focused in this essay is concerned. The defense of downward causation I have provided does not 
rest on claims about the emergence of novel causal facts that are somehow independent of all of 
the causal information (which I assume includes information about conditional causal 
independence) that follows in principle from the lower-level theory. Conditional independence of 
upper-level causal claims does not mean that those claims have no connection with lower-level 
 
34 Here I indulge a common claim in the philosophical literature:  that all true upper-level claims 
are derivable in principle from information about lower-level variables and the laws governing 
their behavior. This claim should be treated with skepticism: One problem  is that it is unclear, 
absent a specification of “in principle” and “derivable”. If the derivation would require a 
computer as big as the solar system would that count as “in principle” derivability? And what 
counts as a “derivation”? For example, does it include use of limiting and asymptotic relations 
and perturbation techniques? Given that on many interpretations,  quantum mechanics and 
quantum field theory give us only information about probabilities of outcomes, and that unlikely 
or unpredictable outcomes will sometimes occur and affect what happens later how does this 
affect such derivability claims? 
 
35 Even  if it is true, as I am conceding for purposes of this essay,  that  we knew “everything” 
about the lower level variables and the laws that characterize their behavior and had unlimited 
computational power we could “derive” all true upper-level causal claims, it does not follow that 
the upper level claims are “reducible” to the lower-level claims. There are many accounts of 
reduction on offer but on most reduction requires something stronger than this sort of 
derivability. For example, many think it requires identities between upper-level and lower-level 
variables. As claimed previously, there are many cases identity is not the appropriate way to 
think about the relation between upper and lower. I will also add that “derive” in this claim 
requires a great deal of additional specification. For example, does it include limiting and 
asymptotic relations, perturbation techniques and so on?  
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theory. Again, I’m willing to stipulate, for purposes of this essay that these facts about 
conditional causal independence are  in some way “contained in” the lower level theory.  In this 
respect the account that I have provided respects what is sometimes called the causal closure of 
the physical—there is no invocation of causal facts that are not present in some form in the 
underlying physics. 
However, leaving matters with just this observation leaves out some considerations of 
great importance, which have to do with epistemology of upper-level causal claims and 
methodologies for finding them   The basic point is that finding out or “seeing” what information 
in lower-level causal claims is conditionally causally irrelevant to upper-level causal  claims and 
what information is conditionally relevant and finding upper-level variables that capture 
conditional irrelevance relations is a highly non-trivial task.  There are many other important 
issues concerning the relation between upper and lower-level causal claims besides the 
metaphysical ones reflected in denials or affirmations of “over and above” claims. The notion of 
conditional causal independence helps in thinking about these “other” issues 
 In an influential essay Anderson, 1972 notes there that  even if it is true that all of the 
information that is relevant  to some set of upper-level phenomena  (such as superconductivity)  
is in some sense contained in an underlying theory, it may be  as a practical matter difficult or 
impossible to  extract the  relevant variables for explaining these upper-level phenomena merely 
from an examination of the lower-level theory. One reason for this is that there are many 
different ways of forming upper-level variables from the variables of the lower-level theory and 
most of these will not lead to the successful formulation of conditional causal independence 
relations. The lower-level theory is not organized around (and doesn’t care about) conditional 
causal independence facts involving upper-level variables, so that both upper-level information 
(e.g., empirically discovered regularities about superconductivity) and in some cases imaginative 
mathematical developments are required to find conditional causal dependence relations 
concerning upper-level variables.  Reductivist minded philosophers sometimes neglect this 
because they think that the only relevant issue is whether various particular upper-level 
explananda are derivable in principle from lower-level facts.  But as illustrated above, such 
derivations at least when considered individually, are not going to disclose the conditional 
independence relations and variables needed for the formulation of upper-level causal claims.  
And even putting this point aside, the fact of in-principle derivability tells us nothing about how 




  The notion of “autonomy” is closely associated with issues having to do with the status 
of upper-level causal claims. What might it mean to claim that a set of upper-level causal claims 
are autonomous with respect to causal claims involving their lower-level realizers? One 
possibility is that upper-level causal claims are (in some sense) completely independent of the 
lower level causal facts—the upper-level is “novel” (and perhaps unexplainable even in 
principle) with respect to the lower level. I rejected this idea above. Another (in my view more 
reasonable) possibility is that autonomy has to do with the extent to which one can discover and 
formulate “good” upper level causal relationships without reference to information about their 
underlying realizers and the laws and causal relations governing these realizers. On this 
understanding of autonomy, the continuum mechanics of fluids is autonomous to the extent that 
one can formulate stable continuum level relationships with uniform effects of upper-level 
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variables (e.g., as in the Navier-Stokes equations) without reference to underlying molecular 
details. Similarly, psychological generalizations are autonomous with respect to neurobiology to 
the extent that there are true psychological generalizations specifying uniform effects on other 
psychological variables, so that psychology can proceed independently of neurobiology.  Of 
course the extent to which this sort of autonomy holds is an empirical matter.  
     This notion of autonomy is closely bound up with the extent to which various 
conditional independence relations hold, thus providing an additional illustration of the 
usefulness of the latter concept. When some causal claim featuring psychological variables is 
autonomous with respect neurobiology, then given the values of some psychological variables,  
further variation in the values of neurobiological variables will be causally  irrelevant to  other 
psychological variables, so that a conditional causal independence relation holds. When this is 
the case, we can ignore the neurobiology to the extent that we are interested in psychological 
effects36. Note again that this does not mean that the psychological claims are causally 
independent of the underlying neurobiology--   instead what is claimed is that the neurobiology 
is conditionally irrelevant to certain psychological variables, given other psychological 
variables37. Although I don’t have the space to argue for this claim in detail here, I believe that it 
is only to the extent that such conditional causal independence relations hold that we have the 
possibility of upper-level or special sciences.  This then is my answer to Fodor’s well-known 
question, “why is there anything but physics?”: The special sciences exist because or to the 
extent that the physics encodes conditional causal independence relations among variables that 
pertain to the sciences in question.  
 
12.  Is Conditional Causal Independence Common?  Can We Make Sense of 
Closeness to Conditional Causal Independence?  
 
Several philosophers with whom I have discussed this issue have claimed that causal 
conditional independence relations of the sort described (or even approximations to them), at 
least when they involve substantial reductions in degrees of freedom are very rare or perhaps 
non-existent and similarly for satisfaction for the conditions I have imposed on downward 
causation. Instead, their idea is that lower-level variables will always have a substantial causal 
impact on other variables, even conditional on the value of suitably chosen upper level variables.  
There are several things to be said about this. First, I emphasize again that whether conditional 
causal independence holds for various Ls, Us and Es is always an empirical matter. It is plausible 
for some lower-level variables L, there may exist no Us with a substantial smaller dimensionality 
than the Ls , conditional on which the Ls become independent of explananda of interest. If the 
lower-level variables L in such a case have high dimensionality and/or the relations among them 
are highly complex, it may prove impossible to formulate true and non-trivial causal claims 
among upper-level variables. (Maybe some systems studied in the social sciences are like this.)     
Moreover, it is true, as noted above, that for most arbitrary sets of Us, Ls and Es causal 
conditional independence, or even approximate causal conditional independence will fail. This 
 
36 Remember that this is a claim about what needs to be case for psychology to be autonomous 
from neurobiology and not an empirical claim about the extent to which such autonomy holds.  
37 It is also not claimed that if the causal relations among psychological variables are real, there 
must not be causal relationships among the underlying neurobiological variables which is what 
downward exclusion arguments claim.  
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does not in itself indicate anything about the usefulness of the conditional independence notion. 
It merely reflects that the fact that “good” upper level-variables are hard to find -- indeed, as 
noted above, they can be hard to find even given a lower-level ground truth from which the 
upper- level variables can be constructed.   
 Despite this I claim that in a number of cases, for Ls that figure in an empirically well 
supported lower-level theory, there will exist upper-level variables U that render the Ls 
conditionally causally independent of various explananda Es of interest. In other words, 
conditional causal independence or a close approximation to it sometimes holds, with the 
interesting scientific problem being to identify the variables for which it holds.    
I have already mentioned some examples (Section 3) but here are some more general 
observations:  
 
12.1. Physics. A number of physical systems exhibit universality in the sense of   
irrelevance of various sorts of lower-level detail to some aspects of the system’s behavior, given 
certain upper level variables. For example, conditional on certain very generic or coarse-grained 
variables having to do with the symmetry of the system, its dimensionality, and the extent to 
which interactions are local, the lower-level details of many very different substances (different 
gas/liquid systems, ferromagnets etc. ) are irrelevant to certain aspects of their behavior near 
their critical points. Explaining why this is so and identifying the relevant upper-level variables 
is one of the triumphs of the renormalization group analysis of such systems.  
 
12.2. Biology. In many cases, organisms are constructed in such a way that certain 
variations in lower-level detail are conditionally irrelevant to more upper-level variables, given 
other upper-level variables to which the organism is responsive. This is so for a variety of 
reasons including selective pressures that reflect the desirability of eliminating the influence of 
various sorts of low-level noise, computational limitations which make it optimal for the 
organism to respond to coarse-grained variables and the fact that the coarse-grained variables can 
sometimes capture all that is ecologically significant.  For example, it would make little sense for 
bodily responses of medium-sized organism like ourselves to dangerous stimuli to vary 
depending on the exact details of, say, the molecular realization of those stimuli—it is the fact 
that the stimulus is dangerous or perhaps that it  involves a particular kind of danger (large 
predator) that is relevant. In such cases and for most of sensory processing we have screening off 
(conditional causal independence) of lower-level detail by ecologically relevant upper- level 
variables with respect to behavioral responses. Thus to the extent that organisms are only 
sensitive to coarse-grained variables rather the details of their realizers, good theories of the 
behavior of these organisms also may only have to keep track of coarse-grained variables. In 
general, there are many examples of biological systems in which some transducing system is 
sensitive only to lower dimensional patterns in some continuous lower-level variable with down-
stream variables being influenced only by the information in the transduced pattern.  Again in 
such cases one has conditional causal independence. That is, such systems operate by finding 
upper-level coarse grained variables that satisfy conditional independence relations with respect 
to lower level variables.  
  
12.3. Relaxing Conditional Causal Independence. So far I have focused on cases in 
which complete conditional causal independence or something close to it holds. However, it is 
 30 
also worth exploring whether there are principled ways of relaxing that requirement38.  One 
possibility is that although there may be rare or exceptional values of  L  that are conditionally 
relevant to E, even given the values of  U, this may not be true for most or “almost all” values of   
L  —for most or almost all such values,   L is conditionally independent of  E, given U even if 
there are a few values of L for which this is not true.  Or perhaps conditional independence holds 
for all values of L and U within a certain large interval, including those values most likely to 
occur (at least around here right now). Or conditional irrelevance or near conditional irrelevance 
may hold on some scales (typically coarser ones) but not on others. Yet another possibility is that 
when we consider possible probability distributions for the values of L that realize various values 
of U we find that conditional independence relations hold with respect to some E for  most 
“well-behaved” probability distributions—e.g., those that  satisfy some continuity condition.   
Finally in cases in which we don’t have complete conditional causal independence, a 
natural question to ask is how much explanatorily or causally relevant information about E do we 
“lose” if we employ U instead of L? (Here relevant information is information about difference-
making variables, understood along interventionist lines.)  One possible way of doing this 
employs a notion of conditional mutual information interpreted causally along the lines described 
in Ay and Polani, 2008: the information loss if we employ U instead of L (or gain if we employ L 
instead of U) is measured by I (E: L) |U) the mutual information between U and E conditional on 
L  where U and L are set by independent interventions in the manner described above39. 
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